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When a witness refuses to answer a question upon the
ground that it will tend to incriminate him the question often
arises as to who shall determine whether his answer will have
this effect, and the case of Ex parte Irwine, 74 Fed. Rep. 954,
recently decided by the United States Circuit Court rules upon
this point.
In a trial upon indictment for violating interstate commerce
laws, the witness refused to answer several questions and was
committed to jail for contempt of court. He applied for a writ
of habeas corpus and in rendering judgment the Circuit Court
stated that it would be subversive of every principle of right
and justice to allow a witness to evade answering a question
upon the bare statement that his answer would tend to incrimi-
nate him, and held that "it is for the trial judge to decide
whether an answer to the question put may reasonably tend to
incriminate the witness, or furnish proof of a link in the chain of
evidence necessary to convict him of a crime. It is not enough
that the answer may furnish evidence which upon some imagin-
ary hypothesis would supply the missing link, but it must appear
to the court from the character of the question and other facts
adduced in the case, that there is some tangible and substantial
probability that the answer of the witness may help to convict
him of a crime. If once the fact of his being in danger be made
to appear, great latitude should be allowed him in judging for
himself the effect of any particular answer, and if he says upon
oath that he cannot answer without accusing himself, he cannot
be compelled to do so."
The very interesting and important question of the effect of
endorsement of bills to fictitious persons, recently came before
the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in Chism, ct al., v. Bank (36 S.
W. R. 387). The facts were as follows: A firm of cotton factors
innocently issued and endorsed a draft to a fictitious person
or order, whom their warehouseman fraudulently represented
to them to be a real person and consignor of cotton. The
warehouseman, using the name of the fictitious person,
indorsed the draft to himself or order, collected it and
absconded. On discovering thb fraud practiced the drawer
sued the defendant bank for wrongful appropriation of the
the draft and refusal to account for the proceeds.
It seems from a note to Bayles Bills, page 179, that the con-
troversy over the effect of endorsement of bill to fictitious per-
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sons grew out of the bankruptcy of Linsay & Co. and Gibson &
Co., London merchants, who negotiated bills with fictitious names
upon them to the amount of nearly a million sterling a year. A
great many cases grew out of these endorsements in the various
courts of England, one of which, 11criet v. Gibson (1789), 3
Term. R. 481, was carried to the House of Lords. But in all
those cases the drafts were purposely drawn in favor of non-
existing parties, and the decision established the doctrine (which
has been followed in subsequent cases) that where the drawer
or maker of a bill of exchange knows that the payee is a ficti-
tious person at the time he makes the draft, a bona fide holder
may recover on it against him as upon a bill pay'able to bearer
(Satlock v. Harris, 3 Term. R. 174; Gibson v. Hunter, 2 H. B1.
i87).
But where the drawer innocently issues or endorses the
draft in favor of a fictitious person, believing him to be real, as
in the case at hand (36 S. W. R. 389), another element is intro-
duced into the controversy. The questions arising out of the
case and submitted to the Supreme Court of Tennessee have
arisen and been discussed in but few of the American courts,
and the conclusions reached by them have been various. Some
of the authorities hold that it will be no defense against a bona
fide holder for the maker or drawer to set up that he did not
know the payee to be fictitious, even though he was free from
any negligence in drawing or making the draft. Others hold
that it is a defense where drawer or maker was ignorant of the
non-existence of the payee, provided that drawer was guilty of
no negligence.
On the one hand, in this country, among text writers, Mr.
Daniel states the rule as general that, "In the case of a note
payable to a fictitious person it appears to be well settled that
any bona fide holder may recover on it against the maker, as
upon a notepayable to bearer. It will be no defense against such
a bona fide holder for the maker to set up that he did not know
the payee to be fictitious." The case of Kohn v. Watkins, 26
Kansas 691, involved the precise questions which were brought up
in the Tennessee case, and the Kansas court followed the
authority of Mr. Daniel. Hatton, C. J., in his opinion, said:
"When a drawer issues a bill to a fictitious payee, although
ignorant of that fact at the time, and parts with the possession
thereof, ought he, in fairness and justice, be allowed to say that
such bill is void?" Where one of two innocent parties must
suffer from the wrongful or tortious acts of a third party, the
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law casts the burden or loss upon him by whose act, omission or
negligence such third party was enabled to commit the wrong
which occasions the loss" (Bank v. Rld. Co., 20 Kan. 520)
All of these cases hold that the drawer is estopped from setting
up as a defense that he did not know such payee to be fictitious
(Cooper v. Mayer, ro B. & C. 468; Schttz v. Astley, 2 Bing. N.
C. 544).
Upon the other hand we have several well-considered
cases which in effect adopt the English rule, to wit, that only
such paper as is issued to a fictitious payee or endorsee by the
party sought to be bound, with full knowledge of the fact, shall
be treated as payable to bearer. This seems to be the better
law, and was followed by the Tennessee courts.
Supporting this view in Armstrong v. Broadway Nat. Bk., 22
N. E. R. 866, it was held: "Where by the ,fraud of a third per-
son a depositor of a bank is induced to draw his draft payable
to a non-existing person or order, the drawer being in ignorance
of the fact and intending no fraud, the bank on which the
draft is so drawn is not authorized to pay it, and charge the
amount to the account of its customer, on the endorsement of
the party presenting it, although it appears -to have been previ-
ously endorsed by the party named as payee. Such endorse-
ment is in effect a forgery, and the payments thereon by the
bank confers no right on it as against the drawer of the draft."
In this case the authorities are carefully reviewed. See, also,
the cases of Dodge v. Bank, 20 Ohio St. 234; Shipinan v. Bank,
27 N. E. 371; Byles on Bills, p. 82; Forbesv. Epsy 21 Ohio St. 483.
O'Brien, J., in one of the cases, says: "The maker's intention
is the controlling consideration which determines the character of
such paper. It cannot be treated as payable to bearer unless the
maker knows the payee to be fictitious and actually intends to
make the paper payable to a fictitious person."
A bank holds a depositor's funds to be paid out to such per-
sons as the depositor directs. It is its duty to pay to the person
named or his order, and to withhold payment until it is satisfied
as to the identity of the payee and the genuineness of his signa-
ture (Morse. Bank, Sec. 474). If a bank pursues any other
course it does so at its own peril.
It is a saying frequently repeated in "The Doctor and the
Student," says Minshall, C. J., that "he who loveth peril shall
perish in it." In other words, where a person has a safe way,
and abandons it for one of uncertainty, he can blame no one but
himself if he meets with misfortune.
